

§1.1 one-period binomial model: mathematical framework:

- Two trading dates ($t=0, t=1$)
- Sample space $\Omega = \{H, T\}$
 $TP(H), TP(T) > 0$
 $TP(H) + TP(T) = 1$
- Bank account w/ 1-period interest rate $r > 0$.
- Single stock w/ initial price S_0 /share; price per share, S_1 , at time 1 is a random variable on Ω :

$$S_1(H) = u S_0 \quad S_1(T) = d S_0$$

where

$$0 < d < 1+r < u$$

\uparrow "down factor" \leftarrow "up factor"

Remarks

- Strategies cannot look into the future.
- A strategy, formally, is characterized by
 - initial capital X_0
 - number of stock shares Δ_0

Rmk For an arbitrary deriv. sec., there is exactly one derivative security:

Suppose this derivative pays V_1 at time $t=1$ (i.e. $V_1(H)$ if H occurs, $V_1(T)$ if T occurs).

Note that to replicate, we need

$$(1) \quad \Delta_0 S_1(H) + (X_0 - \Delta_0 S_0)(1+r) = V_1(H)$$

$$(2) \quad \Delta_0 S_1(T) + (X_0 - \Delta_0 S_0)(1+r) = V_1(T)$$

Subtracting (1)-(2) and solving for Δ_0 yields.

$$\Delta_0 = \frac{V_1(H) - V_1(T)}{S_1(H) - S_1(T)}$$

"Delta-Hedging formula"

Solving for $X_0(1+r)$ in (1) & (2) gives

$$X_0(1+r) = \frac{u-(1+r)}{u-d} V_1(T) + \frac{(1+r)-d}{u-d} V_1(H)$$

We'll use these coefficients a lot so

let's give them names:

$$\tilde{p} = \frac{1+r-d}{u-d} \quad \tilde{q} = \frac{u-1-r}{u-d}$$

*no need to memorize!
 $\tilde{p} + \tilde{q} = 1$ &
 $\tilde{p}u + \tilde{q}d = 1+r$

Note that $\tilde{p} + \tilde{q} = 1$ & $\tilde{p}, \tilde{q} \geq 0$, so

we can think of \tilde{p} and \tilde{q} as probabilities.

def We'll define this as the risk-neutral measure on Ω : $\tilde{\mathbb{P}}(H) = \tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mathbb{P}}(T) = \tilde{q}$.

Then we have that the initial capital, X_0 , of a replicating strategy is

$$X_0 = \frac{1}{1+r} [\tilde{p} V_1(H) + \tilde{q} V_1(T)] = \frac{1}{1+r} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}[V_1]$$

i.e. the interest-adjusted expected value under the risk-neutral measure.

Rmk. The actual probabilities p & q of H & T , respectively, still don't appear in the pricing formula.

Rmk. The risk-neutral probabilities are NOT the real-world probabilities of anything. In fact: changing the currency would change \tilde{p} & \tilde{q} .

Examples. $u=1.4$, $d=0.8$, $r=0.05$

$S_0=100$.

- (i) Price a (European) call with $K_c=92$
- (ii) " " put with $K_p=92$.
- (iii) " " call with $K_c=116$.
- (iv) " " put with $K_p=116$.

$$\text{First of all, } \tilde{p} = \frac{1+r-d}{u-d} = \frac{.25}{.6} = \frac{5}{12}$$

$$\tilde{q} = \frac{u-1-r}{u-d} = 1 - \frac{5}{12} = \frac{7}{12}$$

So:

$$(i) \quad C_1(H) = 140 - 92 = 48 \quad C_1(T) = 0$$

$$X_0 = \frac{1}{1.05} \left[\frac{5}{12} \cdot 48 + \frac{7}{12} \cdot 0 \right] = \frac{20}{21} \cdot 20 = \frac{400}{21} \approx \$19.05.$$

$$(ii) \quad P_1(H) = 0 \quad P_1(T) = 12$$

$$X_0 = \frac{1}{1.05} \left[\frac{5}{12} \cdot 0 + \frac{7}{12} \cdot 12 \right] = \frac{20}{21} \cdot 7 = \frac{140}{21} \approx \$6.67$$

$$(iii) \quad C_1(H) = 24 \quad C_1(T) = 0$$

$$X_0 = \frac{1}{1.05} \left[\frac{5}{12} \cdot 24 \right] = \frac{200}{21} \approx \$9.52$$

$$(iv) \quad P_1(H) = 0 \quad P_1(T) = 36$$

$$X_0 = \frac{1}{1.05} \left[\frac{7}{12} \cdot 36 \right] = \$20 \quad \blacksquare$$

[That was much quicker!]

Put-Call Parity

Rmk

Note that for any put P and call C that have the same strike price, $P_1(w)$ and $C_1(w)$ cannot both be positive (for any outcome $w \in \Omega$).

Def
Let $(x)^+$ denote the "positive part" of x .
That is, $(x)^+ = \max(x, 0)$.

$$\text{so } C_1 = (S_1 - K)^+ \\ P_1 = (K - S_1)^+$$

Fact For any x , $x^+ - (-x)^+ = x$.

Pf. Try proving this yourself! Hint: consider the cases $x=0$, $x<0$, $x>0$ separately. \blacksquare

Put-Call Parity

Portfolio 1: Buy one put, P , & sell short one call, C .

The cost is $P_0 - C_0$ and the payout at the maturity date T is

$$V_1 = (K - S_1)^+ - (S_1 - K)^+ = K - S_1.$$

Portfolio 2: Invest $\frac{K}{1+r}$ in the bank and sell short one share of stock.

This costs $\frac{K}{1+r} - S_0$ at $t=0$ and the payout at time 1 is $K - S_1$.

Since the two portfolios have the same payout (in any situation) they must require the same initial capital, so we see


$$P_0 - C_0 = \frac{K}{1+r} - S_0$$

★ This is independent of the exact choice of model!

Example

Recall Example 1.6(i) from the supplementary notes.

We had the situation $r=0.2$



where P is a put w/ $K=10, T=1$.

We wanted to find C_0 for a call C with $K=10 \& T=1$.

Put-call parity now quickly gives

$$\begin{aligned} C_0 &= P_0 + S_0 - \frac{K}{1+r} \\ &= 2.50 + 10 - \frac{10}{1.2} \\ &\approx \$4.17 \end{aligned}$$

(which matches what we got by solving for α, β, γ). ■

{ more on the risk-neutral measure ... }

Proposition. In the one-period model,

there's no arbitrage $\Leftrightarrow d < 1+r < u$.

Proof (overview):

(\Rightarrow) Proof by contrapositive:

Suppose $d \geq 1+r$. Then if we borrow S_0 from bank to buy a share of stock ($X_0=0$) we'll have $X_1 = S_1 - S_0(1+r) = \begin{cases} (u-(1+r))S_0 & \text{if } H \\ \text{or} \\ (d-(1+r))S_0 & \text{if } T \end{cases}$

Since $u \geq d \geq 1+r$, we have no risk of loss. So this is an arbitrage!! Same idea if $u \leq 1+r$ (can you fill out the corresponding proof for that case?).


(\Leftarrow) Suppose $d < 1+r < u$. Let X be some strategy

$$\begin{aligned} w/ X_0=0. \text{ It has } X_T &= \Delta_0 S_1 + (X_0 - \Delta_0 S_0)(1+r) \\ &= \Delta_0 S_1 + (-\Delta_0 S_0)(1+r). \end{aligned}$$

This is $\Delta_0 u S_0 - \Delta_0 S_0(1+r) = \Delta_0 S_0 (u - 1 - r)$ if H
& $\Delta_0 d S_0 - \Delta_0 S_0(1+r) = \Delta_0 S_0 (d - 1 - r)$ if T .

Note: if $\Delta_0 = 0$ then the payout $X_1 = 0$. If $\Delta_0 > 0$, $X_1(H) > 0$ & $X_1(T) < 0$. If $\Delta_0 < 0$, $X_1(H) < 0$ & $X_1(T) > 0$. So no arbitrage is possible (always chance of loss). ■

IRON MAN AND DEADPOOL
-IN-
PUT-CALL PARITY



NEED SOME HELP THERE, TOMY?



I got this. I'll compute the price of this put option - the old fashioned way!

...K, BUDDY. I'LL JUST LEAVE THIS HERE.

$C_0 - P_0 = S_0 - \frac{K}{1+r}$
= "PUT-CALL PARITY"

